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SIERRA CLUB v. U.S. FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE:
THE PHOENIX OF CRITICAL
HABITAT DESIGNATION
Michael Fuller*
I. INTRODUCTION
In its March 2001 decision, Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service,' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed a decision
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana, which had
granted the defendant U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (Service) summary
judgment. The Court of Appeals held that the Service's decision to not
designate "critical habitat" was arbitrary and capricious.2 The Fifth Circuit
found that much of the Service's decision3 was based on a regulation4 that
conflicted with the provisions of the Endangered Species Act'.6 That
regulation required consultation only when concerns for both recovery and
survival of a threatened species were raised, while the Endangered Species
Act required consultation if either recovery or survival was at issue.
This Note examines the Fifth Circuit's decision in Sierra Club v. U.S.
Fish and Wildlife Service and determines that the Fifth Circuit reached the
correct conclusion in light of the intentions underlying the Endangered
Species Act. A review of recent court decisions show that courts are
currently refusing to defer to agency decisions concerning critical habitat
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2003.
1. 245 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Sierra Club].
2. Id. at 436.
3. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Decision on Designation of Critical
Habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. 9967 (Feb. 27, 1998) [hereinafter Gulf
Sturgeon].
4. 50 C.F.R. § 402 (2001).
5. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994).
6. Id. at 443.
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designations, and instead are enforcing the intentions of Congress by
holding that critical habitat designations are the rule, not the exception.
H1. BACKGROUND
The sturgeon species has existed on the Earth for roughly two hundred
million years.7 The Gulf Sturgeon, the specific subject of this litigation, is
restricted to the Gulf of Mexico and its tributaries,' feeding primarily in
marine habitats and breeding in freshwater.9 The species sexually matures
between seven and twenty-one years of age, and reaches at least forty-two
years of age.'0 Although not well documented, it is believed that they lay
their eggs in deep, rock or sandy-bottomed areas, spawning only once every
two or three years." The sturgeon spends three or four summer months in
marine or estuarine water feeding, but eats little during the eight or nine
months it spends in the river. 2 The Gulf Sturgeon was formerly sufficient
in population to sustain commercial and sport fisheries into the 1970s. 3
7. Linda Lord, Guide to Florida Environmental Issues and Information: Chapter 5,
Florida's Wetland & Freshwater Ecosystems: The Gulf Sturgeon, available at
http://www.ficus.usf.eduldocs/guideissueslchap5/chap5-6.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2001).
Sturgeons have been called living fossils. Florida's Freshwater Fisheries: Fisheries
Updates, Division of Fisheries: Hillsborough River Sturgeon Release, available at http:II
floridaconservation.org/fishing/updates/sturgeon.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2002).
8. Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Babbitt, No. 94-3510, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23909, at
*5 (E.D. La. Oct. 28, 1997) [hereinafter Orleans Audubon Soc'y]. The Gulf Sturgeon's
current range is from eastern Louisiana to northwestern Florida, but formerly ran from the
Rio Grande to Florida Bay. At least four different river-specific populations remain. Joseph
E. Hightower and Dewayne Fox, Gulf Sturgeon Spawning Habitat in the Choctawatchee
River, Florida/Alabama, available at http:/lwww 4.ncsu.edu/unity/users/j/jhncsu/public
/GSturgeonSpawn.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2001). Other studies, however, indicate at least
five separate populations. Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9970.
9. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 436; National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
National Marine Fisheries Service, Southeast Regional Office, Gulf Sturgeon (Acipenser
Oxyrinchus desotoi), available at http://www.cadera.sero.nmfs.gov/protectlglfsturg.pdf (last
visited Jan. 26, 2002) [hereinafter NMFS/SERO].
10. Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9970. Females have a narrower age range, between
eight and seventeen years of age. Other studies set the ranges slightly lower. National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Marine Fisheries, Office of Protected
Resources, Gulf Sturgeon, available at http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/prot-res/species/fish/
GuiLsturgeon.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2001) [hereinafter NMFS/OPR] (indicating maturity
ranges of eight to twelve years of age for females and seven to ten years of age for males).
11. NMFS/OPR, supra note 10. The Gulf Sturgeon has a strong homing instinct,
returning to spawn in the same river every year. See also NMFS/SERO, supra note 9.
12. NMFS/SERO, supra note 9.
13. Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9971. Records indicate that the principal fisheries
were in western Florida. From 1972 to 1990, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida and Louisiana
all enacted laws prohibiting takings of Gulf Sturgeon. Id. See also U.S. Fish and Wildlife
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The Sturgeon's population crash has been primarily attributed to overfish-
ing,14 but several factors have contributed to the sturgeon's inability to
rebound. 5 In addition to a fishing ban, current conservation efforts include
closer scrutiny of river modifications and the use of turtle exclusion devices
(TEDs) on Gulf shrimp trawlers. 6
The Gulf Sturgeon was formally listed as a threatened species on
September 30, 199l.'7 The listing placed the species under the protection
of the Endangered Species Act (ESA).'" The ESA makes it mandatory that
the listing agency designate "critical habitat"19 for the species.2' Mandatory
Service Division of Endangered Species, Species Accounts: Gulf Sturgeon, available at
http://endangered.fws.govlilelsae2w.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2001).
14. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 436. See also Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9971-72;
Kevin Begos, Gulf Sturgeon Numbers Are Critically Low, PANAMA CITY NEWS HERALD,
Feb. 28, 1999, available at http://www.newsherald.comarchive/features/wb022899.htm (last
visited Sept. 2, 2001) (FWS officially estimates that approximately 200 fish still inhabit the
Apalachicola River, and commenting that "[plictures from the turn of the century show
sturgeon stacked like cordwood on the docks..." ).
15. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23900, at *37-38. See also Gulf
Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9971-72. A FWS notice of decision cites the following reasons:
the damming of rivers, which prevents upstream spawning and warm weather refuge;
dredging and soil disposal, which disrupt rocky bottoms, fill deep water holes, and alter cool
water aquifers; contaminants from pesticides and heavy metals, which impair reproduction
and normal growth; and the introduction of cultured stocks, which is thought to reduce
genetic diversity and introduce disease. Each factor is magnified when considered in
conjunction with the time it takes the Sturgeon to reach sexual maturity. Id. James R.
Morrow, James P. Kirk, K. Jack Killgore, and Howard E. Rogillio, Recommended
Enhancements to the Gulf Sturgeon Recovery and Management Plan Based on Pearl River
Studies, 19 N. AMER. J. FIsHERiES MGMT. 1117, 1120 (1999) (observing that populations
with very few reproducing individuals would be at a high extinction risk should any
deleterious event occur).
16 Louisiana Dept. of Wildlife and Fisheries, Threatened and Endangered Species:
Gulf Sturgeon, at http://www.wlf.state.la.us/appslnetgear/index.asp?cn=lawlf&pid=704 (last
visited Feb. 4, 2002).
17. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants; Threatened Status for the Gulf
Sturgeon, 56 Fed. Reg. 49,653 (Sept. 30, 1991).
18. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1994). "The purposes of [the ESA] are to provide a
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species
depend may be conserved, to provide a program for conservation of such endangered and
threatened species and to take such steps as may be appropriate to achieve [various] treaties
and conventions." Id. § 1531(b).
19. Critical habitat is defined as the "specific areas containing features essential to the
conservation of the species and that may require special management considerations or
protections." Id. § 1532(5)(A).
20. See Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1193(10' Cir. 1999) (holding that
critical habitat designatin is nondiscretionary.) While generally only encompassing the
geographical area actually occupied by a species at the time of listing, it can also include
unoccupied areas essential for conservation of the species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(ii).
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critical habitat designation can only be overcome if an agency finds such
designation either "not determinable"'" or "not prudent."22 Also, once a
species has been listed, any federal agency about to engage in an action that
could potentially impact that species must consult with the listing agency.23
In interpreting the ESA, the United States Supreme Court has held that
Congress intended to afford listed species the highest of protection
priorities.24
III. THE SUBJECT CASE
A. Factual Background
The Pearl River rises in east-central Mississippi and flows southward,
forming the Louisiana/Mississippi border, before splitting into the East
Pearl and West Pearl Rivers. 25 Louisiana's West Pearl River contains one
of the few known remaining stocks of Gulf Sturgeon.26 The listing of those
Unoccupied critical habitat is defined as "specific areas outside the geographical area
occupied by the species at the time it is listed" that "are essential for the conservation of the
species." Id. Occupied critical habitat is defined as "the specific areas within the geographic
area occupied by the species, at the time it is listed... on which are found those physical
or biological features (i) essential to conservation of the species, and (ii) which may require
special management considerations or protection." Id. § 1532(5)(A)(i).
21. 50 C.F.R. § 424.12 (2001). A "not determinable" finding occurs when there is
either insufficient information to analyze designation impact, or the biological needs of the
species are not well enough known. Id. § 424.12(a)(2).
22. Id. § 424.12. A "not prudent" finding occurs when the threat of "takes" can be
expected to increase because of identification, or because designation would not be
beneficial to the species. Id. § 424.12(a)(1). "Take" is defined as "to harass, harm, pursue,
hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to engage in any such conduct"
in regard to a listed species. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
23. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2); 50 C.F.R. § 402.01. Consultation is necessary to ensure
that an agency action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species
or result in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.
24. See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176-82 (1978) (holding that
the Endangered Species Act prohibited impoundment of the Little Tennessee River by the
Tellico Dam; that, through the Act, Congress intended to halt and reverse the trend toward
species extinction, whatever the cost; and that Congress made it clear that endangered
species are to be accorded the highest priorities). For a brief and concise overview of the
Endangered Species Act, see TONY A. SULLENS, ESA: ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT (ABA
Publishing 2001).
25. Coalition to Restore Coastal Louisiana, The Pearl River Estuary, at http:/www.
crcl.org/pubs/wiselpearl.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2001). The Pearl River is currently one
of the five known regional habitats of the Gulf Sturgeon. Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at
9970.
26. Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. at 9970.
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stocks triggered a critical habitat designation decision pursuant to the
ESA.27 That decision, in the hands of the Secretary of the Department of
the Interior, was delegated to both the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
(FWS) and to the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS).2" The
Secretary of the Interior, having been handed the determination duty, had
one year from the listing date to designate critical habitat, but deferred any
decision for two consecutive one-year periods.29 The Orleans Audubon
Society filed an action with the U. S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana seeking designation of critical habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon.30
Following discovery, the plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment.3
At an August 9, 1995 hearing, the defendant FWS did not contest liability,
agreed that the FWS had missed the deadline, and stated that it was
prepared to act in designating critical habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon.32 The
court then ordered the defendant to "take all appropriate action on August
21, 1995."33 Between the initiation of the injunction action and the August
9, 1995 hearing, the FWS had circulated a draft decision which proposed
actual designation of critical habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon.34
Two weeks after circulating the draft opinion, in an opinion published
on August 23, 1995, the FWS did an about-face, finding that such
designation was "not prudent" based on a lack of benefit to the species.35
The plaintiffs then attempted to amend their complaint and asked the court
to find the FWS in contempt,36 while the defendant moved to dismiss the
complaint.37 The court found that the Service had made a good faith
27. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A)(2001).
28. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23909, at *2 n. 1 (citing 50 C.F.R.
§ 402.01(b)). FWS makes freshwater habitat determinations, while NMFS handles marine
designations. Id.
29. Id. at *6.
30. Id.
31. Id. at *3.
32. Id. at *6.
33. Id.
34. Id. at *7. The draft order, dated May 22, 1995, stated that designation would
provide the species additional protection.
35. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants: Decisions on Designation of
Critical Habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, 60 Fed. Reg. 43,721 (Aug. 23, 1995).
36. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y v. Dept. of the Interior, No. 94-3510, 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1090, at *1 (E.D. La. Jan. 31, 1996). Plaintiffs argued that the defendant had
misapplied the "not prudent" exception, and thus failed to follow the ESA prescription for
critical habitat designation. Id. at *3.
37. Id. at *1. Defendants contended that the designation was lawfully made pursuant
to its own regulations, and that the case should be dismissed as moot. Id. at *3.
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interpretation of the court's order, so no contempt finding was warranted."
However, the court denied dismissal of the complaint until it could review
the FWS findings for appropriateness.39
B. The District Court's October 28, 1997 Decision
The amended complaint alleged that the FWS had relied on only a
fraction of the "best scientific data available,"' as well as the prior claim
that the "not prudent" decision was based on an improper statutory
exception."' Reviewing the administrative record under the Administrative
Procedures Act (APA),42 the court first found that the FWS's interpretation
of the ESA was reasonable.43 In so finding, the court first stated that the
plaintiffs were incorrect in trying to narrow the prudence exception to
merely when detrimental to the species." The court chose to ignore the
legislative history of the ESA and the regulation in favor of the "clear and
unambiguous" wording of the statute,4" functionally concluding that critical
habitat designation must meet a minimum threshold of benefit to the
species.' Because the defendants had demonstrated that other laws,
projects and cooperative efforts afforded similar or better benefit, the court
held that summary judgment for the plaintiffs would be inappropriate.47
Further, the court found that the FWS's decision, that jeopardy
consultation duplicates critical habitat protection, was reasonable.4" The
38. Id. at *4.
39. Id. at *5. The court allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaint.
40. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23909, at *3. The author of the
FWS decision, Dr. Michael M. Bentzien, stated that the file on the Gulf Sturgeon was
voluminous, but that the administrative record was only made up of "non-privileged
documents relied upon by the agency in reaching the determination that critical habitat...
is not prudent." Id. at *8 n.3.
41. See supra note 34.
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706(2001). The APA limits judicial review to the administrative
record that was before the agency at the time that the decision was rendered. Such a review
is confined to determining whether the action was "arbitrary, capricious, abuse of discretion
or otherwise not in accordance with the law." Id. § 706(2)(A).
43. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist LEXIS 23909, at *23.
44. Id. at *27-28. The court saw the regulation as two separate examinations; one
occurs when critical habitat designation is actively detrimental to the species, and the other
when it is merely not beneficial. Id. at *28.
45. Id. at *27.
46. "[lI]f there is nothing to be gained over and above the status quo, then there is no
benefit." Id. at *28.
47. Id. at *29-30. The court also observed that such a determination was "within the
agency's expertise and mission." Id. at *29.
48. Id. at *30. Jeopardy consultation applies even if no critical habitat designation has
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court thus denied the plaintiffs' summary judgment motion, reasoning that
the plaintiffs' amended complaint failed to assail the validity of the
defining regulation.49 The court also deferred to the FWS's interpretation
of the ESA and its own regulations.50
The court was less deferential regarding the FWS's conclusions and its
"best scientific data" support. While admitting that there had been some
degree of study, the court found no rational connection between the meager
scientific data in the record and the FWS's final decision. 51 "On the
contrary, it appears that the Final Decision is based more on the agency's
views of the present status of legislation and governmental programs than
an evaluation of the best scientific data available."52 Thus, the court found
that the defendant had failed to consider the best scientific data available,
and to rationally connect it to the decision.5" As the court could not order
the defendant to designate critical habitat, it was forced to remand the
designa tion to the Service for a review of the best scientific data
available.54
On February 27, 1998, the FWS decided, on remand, that the critical
habitat designation remained "not prudent.- 55 Following a challenge of that
been made, while critical habitat consultation applies only if a critical habitat has been
designated. Both processes require federal agencies to consult with the Secretary to ensure
that agency action is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of an endangered or
threatened species. Id. n.15 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)).
49. Id. at *33.
50. Id. The court also went one step further, holding that the defendant could
reasonably find (although it had not specifically done so), that critical habitat designation
would offer no additional protection over the jeopardy standard. Id.
51. Id. at *35-36.
52. Id. at *36. The court also compared the initial draft proposal, at thirty-five pages
with fifty-plus citations, to the Final Decision, at thirteen pages and eight citations. Four of
the cited studies were missing from the Final Decision administrative record, and none
indicated how they would help conserve Gulf Sturgeon habitat. Id. at *36-37.
53. Id. at *40. In reaching this holding, the court observed that the defendants had
"violated the clear mandate of Congress expressed in the ESA" by falling to utilize the best
scientific data available. Id. at *39.
54. Id. at *40.
55. Decision on Designation of Critical Habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg.
9967 (Feb. 27, 1998). The Final Decision states specifically that critical habitat consultation
applies only to federal agency actions and that federal actions adversely modifying habitat
are nearly always found to also jeopardize the species concerned. Thus, the FWS reasoned,
critical habitat designation would not impact the outcome of consultation. The only place
that it might escape jeopardy consultation would be under unoccupied critical habitat; but
since the sturgeon is merely threatened, unoccupied critical habitat would not immediately
be required for their survival. Id. at 996.
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decision, the district court found that The FWS's conclusions were
"minimally rational" and supported by the best scientific data available. 56
C. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's Decision
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the underlying regulation facially
conflicted with the ESA, and that as such, the 1998 Final Decision itself
was arbitrary and capricious. 57 They contested the district court's decision
on three grounds: first, that the regulation underlying the decision facially
conflicted with the ESA, and thus the FWS's decision itself was invalid;
second, that the FWS misinterpreted the ESA when it concluded that
unoccupied critical habitat was not necessary to threatened species; and
third, that the decision was arbitrary and capricious for failing to consider
the informational benefits of critical habitat designation.58
The court first examined whether the regulation59 conflicted with the
ESA. 60 It found that the regulation did not equate the "jeopardy consulta-
tion" with the "destruction/adverse modification consultation" standards.6'
How-ever, the regulation did establish a higher consultation threshold than
the ESA.62 The court then perused the legislative history, finding that
Congress had actually chosen to pass over the regulatory definition of
"critical habitat."63 The Fifth Circuit observed that 50 C.F.R. § 402.02
would establish a higher consultation standard that would make critical
habitat far less likely to be designated." Such infrequent designa
56. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 437-38. The court supported the FWS's decision in spite
of recognizing that the regulation on which their reasoning was based, 50 C.F.R. § 402.02,
appeared to conflict with the ESA's language. Id.
57. ld. at 440-41.
58. See id. at 440, 444.
59. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001).
60. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 440-41. Review of regulations interpreting the ESA falls
under Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984) (requiring a court to reverse an agency decision if either clearly contrary to
congressional intent, or an impermissible construction of a silent or ambiguous statute). As
the plaintiffs did not address the reasonableness of the decision-making process, the court
did not need to review the regulation under the APA. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 441, n.37.
61 Id. at 441. The destruction/adverse modification standard is defined in terms of
diminishing value of critical habitat, while the jeopardy standard is focused on survival and
recovery of the species. Id.
62. Id. at 441-42. The ESA essentially establishes that the threshold for consultation
is merely a threat to recovery, while the regulation requires a danger to both recovery and
survival. See id.
63. Id. at 442-43.
64. Id. at 443. An agency would be less likely to have to consult for a "recovery and
survival" standard than merely "recovery." That lowered volume of consulting would likely
[Vol. 7:2
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tion of critical habitat would thus be contrary to, and actually an inversion
of, congressional intent.65 Thus, the court held that the regulation was
facially invalid.'
The court then turned to the FWS's decision,67 and reviewed the
reasonableness of the decision under the APA." The court first found that
the facially invalid regulatory provision69 had in fact substantiated the
decision to not designate critical habitat.7"
The court also noted that the FWS erred in reasoning that because a
threatened species is not at current risk of extinction, "unoccupied critical
habitat would not be immediately required for their survival."'" Such
reasoning, the court observed, would preclude critical habitat designation
for all threatened species.72 That preclusion could not be reconciled with
the provision of the ESA that critical habitat shall be designated for both
endangered and threatened species.73 The court then concluded that "the
1998 decision was arbitrary and capricious. 74
In examining the issue of failure to consider informational benefits, the
court found that the ESA contained no affirmative requirement of
notification when rendering a habitat decision.75 The court held that failure
result in a higher volume of "not prudent" findings. Id.
65. Id. "Not prudent" findings should occur only in rare or limited circumstances. Id.
66. d The court did note, however, that only the definition of "destruction/adverse
modification" in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 was invalid; the remainder of the regulation was still
effective. Id. at n.61.
67. Decision on Designation of Critical Habitat for Gulf Sturgeon, 63 Fed. Reg. 9967
(Feb. 27, 1998).
68. See Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 444; see also, 5 U.S.C. §8 701-706.
69. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (2001).
70. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 444-45. Evaluation of critical habitat was based on the
premise that "jeopardy consultation was 'functionally the equivalent' to consultation under
the destruction/adverse modification standard." Id. at 445. That premise was arrived at
through the faulty definition in 50 C.F.R. § 402.02, casting the two consultation standards
in similar terms. Thus, the functional equation of the two was also flawed.
71. Id. at445.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
74. Id. The court also noted that the FWS's use of the best scientific data available did
not overcome the errors induced through the application of 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. Id.
75. See id. at 446. The ESA contemplated participation of federal and state agencies,
as well as private actors, in the designation process. Id. at 446, n.79. However, while
critical habitat designation does provide outside parties with valuable information,
participation is primarily geared to benefit the designating agency in making its determina-
tion. The only requirements of the ESA are publication in a local newspaper and the Federal
Register, notification of state and local governments, and a discretionary consideration to
notify such professional scientific organizations as the Secretary deems appropriate. Id. at
446, n.80 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(5)). The court does note, however, that in not holding
20021
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to consider the informational benefits was not arbitrary and capricious.76
Finally, the court concluded that because the FWS had relied on an
invalid regulation, the Service's 1998 Final Decision was arbitrary and
capricious.77 The Fifth Circuit then remanded to the FWS to "reconsider
their decision in light of the appropriate legal standards."78
IV. DISCUSSION
The holding and observations of the court in Sierra Club v. U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service are consistent with similar cases applying the
provisions of the ESA to critical habitat designations. The court properly
determined that the regulatory definition of the "destruction/adverse
modification" standard was facially invalid, as it directly conflicted with
the intent and wording of the statute. The court also correctly remanded the
decision because it was arbitrary and capricious.
In holding that the regulation was facially invalid, the Fifth Circuit
contradicted the lower court, finding that the legislative history should have
been consulted for clarification of congressional intent.79 The Orleans
Audubon Society court had originally held that in determining the
reasonableness of the "not prudent" decision,80 it was unnecessary for the
court to consult the legislative history, as the regulation and the ESA were
"clear and unambiguous."'" In so holding, it rejected the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Department of
Interior.s2 In the end, the district court rejected the need to consult the
legislative history by deferring to the agency's "expertise and mission."8 3
In its consideration, the Fifth Circuit implicitly rejected the district
court's reasoning, examining the genesis of the language of the regulation
that the FWS should consider informational benefits in every instance, it is in disagreement
with the holding of Conservation Council for Hawaii v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1280, 1288
(D. Haw. 1998).
76. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 446.
77. Id. at 447.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 442, n. 51
80. Decision on the Designation of Critical Habitat for the Gulf Sturgeon, 60 Fed. Reg.
43,721 (Aug. 23, 1995).
81. See Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23909, at *27.
82. 113 F.3d 1121 (9' Cir. 1997) [hereinafter Natural Resources Defense Council].
The court in Natural Resources Defense Council utilized legislative history to find that
Congress intended the prudence exception to apply only rarely and that the FWS had acted
arbitrarily. Id. at 1127.
83. Orleans Audubon Soc'y, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23909, at *29.
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as compared to the statute. 84 Further, the court used the Natural Resources
Defense Council reasoning to attack the underlying rationale of the
agency's 1998 decision.85 While on the surface respectful of the lower
court's determinations, the Fifth Circuit nonetheless emphatically rejected
the Orleans Audubon Society court's deference to the agency in favor of
determining the intent underlying the ESA.
Both the FWS's 1998 decision and the Orleans Audubon Society
court's holding represent a very basic misunderstanding regarding the
importance of listed species protection. The underlying intent of the ESA
must be understood to represent Congress' belief that the protection of
listed species is of the highest priority.
In Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,6 the Supreme Court was asked
to lift an order enjoining a federal agency from completing a dam project.87
In affirming the injunction, the Court consulted the legislative history of the
ESA8" and determined that Congress intended to devote whatever efforts
and resources were necessary to prevent extinction, 9 irrespective of cost.'
In Sierra Club, the court cast aside arguments favoring deference to agency
decisions, and instead grasped the core purpose of the ESA: the recovery
of species and their removal from listing. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's decision
squares with Supreme Court precedent.
Tennessee Valley Authority dictates that it is the FWS's duty to do
whatever is necessary to bring a listed species back.9' Defenders of Wildlife
v. Andrus92 seems prescient of that decision. The plaintiffs were attempting
to force the FWS to redraft its rules allowing hunting of migratory birds
between certain hours.93 The defendant took the position that the ESA only
requires that regulations do not jeopardize the continued existence of
protected species.94 The court found that the FWS had misinterpreted the
84. Sierra Club, 245 F.3d at 442-43.
85. Id. at 445, n.73. The Fifth Circuit Court quoted the Ninth Circuit and questioned
the court's reasoning that designation is not beneficial to a species if it is not of optimal
benefit to that species.
86. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
87. That dam project would have likely eradicated both the Snail Darter habitat and
possibly the species itself. Id. at 162.
88. Id. at 177-84.
89. Id. at 177.
90. See id. at 174. In this case, the cost was the completion of a multi-million dollar
dam project.
91. Id. at 180.
92. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
93. Id. at 168-69.
94. Id. at 169.
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ESA's purpose and requirements,95 and declared that, under the ESA, the
Service "has an affirmative duty to increase the population of a protected
species."
Finally, Congress had intended that instances of no critical habitat
designation would be rare. However, in 1992, 546 of 651 listed species
were undesignated.97 By 1999, only 120 of 1181 listed species had been
designated.98 The slim percentages of actual designation beg the question
of why the Service has been so frugal in critical habitat designation.
The "cost" faced by the Sierra Club court in ordering reconsideration
of critical habitat for the Gulf sturgeon was neither determined nor
immediately determinable. However, cost considerations have played a
role in past agency decisions."
The ESA provides that critical habitat designation be made within one
year of listing of a species. '0 In Forest Guardians v. Babbitt,' the
Secretary of the Interior had twice extended the deadline when plaintiffs
moved to compel designation of critical habitat.'0 2 The defendant cited the
congressional spending moratoria as a mitigating circumstance for the
requested rejection of the injunction.' While the lower court had deferred
to the agency's determination,"' 4 the Tenth Circuit held that resource
limitations were no justification for failure to comply with the mandatory,
non-discretionary duties imposed by the ESA.'° 5
Similarly in this case, budgetary and time constraints likely played a
role, albeit tacit, in the delay and refusal to designate critical habitat. When
95. Id. The court stated that the Service "must do far more than merely avoid the
elimination of protected species. It must bring these species back from the brink so that they
may be removed from the protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so."
Id. at 170.
96. Id. at 170.
97. See Thomas F. Darin, Comment: Designating Critical Habitat Under the
Endangered Species Act: Habitat Protection Versus Agency Discretion, 24 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 209, 224 (2000).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 231-35.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(A) (2001). The agency also has the option of a one-year
extension if certain criteria are met. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(6)(C)(ii).
101. 174 F.3d 1178 (10" th Cir. 1999) (amending Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 164 F.3d
1261 (10' Cir. 1998)).
102. Id. at 1182.
103. Id. at 1182-83.
104. Id. at 1184.
105. See id. at 1192. The court stated that it was sympathetic to the Secretary's plight,
and praised him for prioritizing to afford the greatest benefit that he could to the species, but
nonetheless found his argument of impossibility to perform premature. Id. at 1191-93.
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such designation is so often immediately necessary, concerns similar to
Forest Guardians would likely inform the process, whether actually cited
or not.
V. CONCLUSION
Critical habitat designation is generally a species' last refuge before
extinction. It is critical not only in terms of geography, but also in expedi-
ency of the designation. The ESA was crafted for the express purpose of
conserving both ecosystems and endangered and threatened species. In
keeping with the Supreme Court's holding that listed species have priority
over federal agency missions, courts are returning to the notion that the
ESA is more than merely statutory paces that the FWS is put through.
Rather, it is a congressional mandate that affords listed species the optimal
intended federal protections. Courts are often the last line of defense
against arbitrary agency decisions, and it is the courts that must hold
governmental, public and private parties' feet to the fire to ensure
compliance with the ESA.
In that line of progressive, preservationist thinking, Sierra Club is a
valuable precedent because it reemphasizes the underlying intent and
values of the ESA and reverses the trend of courts in deferring to agency
decisions. Sierra Club makes manifest the mandate of Congress that the
ESA is about moving species off the list, not merely maintaining the status
quo.
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